39 KiB
Phase 3: Operator Experience - Research
Researched: 2026-03-23 Domain: Slack OAuth V2, Stripe Subscriptions, BYO API Key Encryption, Cost Dashboard Confidence: HIGH (core stack verified against official docs)
<user_constraints>
User Constraints (from CONTEXT.md)
Locked Decisions
- Slack connection via standard OAuth2 "Add to Slack" flow — operator clicks button, authorizes, tokens stored automatically
- WhatsApp connection: guided manual setup (Claude's discretion confirmed)
- After connecting a channel, the wizard MUST include a "send test message" step — required, not optional
- Test message verifies end-to-end connectivity before the agent goes live
- Onboarding sequence: Connect Channel → Configure Agent → Send Test Message
- Agent goes live automatically after the test message succeeds — no separate "Go Live" button
- Pricing model: per-agent monthly (e.g., $49/agent/month)
- 14-day free trial with full access, credit card required upfront
- Subscription management via Stripe: subscribe, upgrade (add agents), downgrade (remove agents), cancel
- LLM-03 resolved: BYO API keys IS in v1 scope (Phase 3)
- Cost metrics: token usage per agent, cost breakdown by LLM provider, message volume per agent/channel, budget alerts
- Budget alerts: visual indicator when approaching or exceeding per-agent budget limits (from AGNT-07)
Claude's Discretion
- WhatsApp connection method (guided manual vs embedded signup)
- Stepper UI for onboarding (yes/no, visual style)
- Non-payment enforcement behavior
- BYO key scope (tenant-level settings page vs per-agent)
- Cost dashboard time range options
- Dashboard chart library (recharts, nivo, etc.)
- Stripe webhook event handling strategy (idempotency, retry)
Deferred Ideas (OUT OF SCOPE)
None — discussion stayed within phase scope </user_constraints>
<phase_requirements>
Phase Requirements
| ID | Description | Research Support |
|---|---|---|
| AGNT-07 | Agent token usage tracked per-agent per-tenant with configurable budget limits | Audit event JSONB metadata must store prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, provider; budget stored on Tenant model; alert threshold query pattern documented |
| LLM-03 | Tenant can provide their own API keys for supported LLM providers (BYO keys, encrypted at rest) | Fernet AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA256; envelope encryption pattern; new tenant_llm_keys table; LiteLLM routing integration |
| PRTA-03 | Operator can connect messaging channels (Slack, WhatsApp) via guided wizard | Slack OAuth V2 flow; required scopes; token storage in channel_connections.config; WhatsApp manual setup steps |
| PRTA-04 | New tenants are guided through structured onboarding (connect channel, configure agent, test message) | Stepper UI pattern; Next.js App Router multi-step page; test message endpoint |
| PRTA-05 | Operator can manage subscription plans and billing via Stripe integration | Stripe Checkout with per-seat quantity; Billing Portal for self-service; webhook event map; idempotency pattern |
| PRTA-06 | Portal displays agent cost tracking and usage metrics per tenant | SQL aggregate query on audit_events; JSONB path extraction; Recharts for visualization; time-range filtering |
| </phase_requirements> |
Summary
Phase 3 adds the commercial and operational layer to the Konstruct portal: Slack OAuth, subscription billing, BYO key encryption, and a cost dashboard. All four areas are well-trodden territory with mature libraries — the risks are in integration details, not algorithmic complexity.
The largest architectural gap is in the audit trail: the existing audit_events.metadata JSONB field stores model and iteration but NOT prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, or cost_usd. These fields must be added to the audit logger before the cost dashboard can function. This is a prerequisite for PRTA-06 and AGNT-07 and needs to be Wave 0 work.
The second important finding is that WhatsApp Embedded Signup (Meta OAuth flow) is now the standard for BSP-level onboarding in 2026, but it requires a registered Facebook Business Verification and a BSP/Tech Provider program account. For v1 "guided manual setup" is the correct choice — it means operators manually create a WhatsApp Business App, get their phone number token, and paste credentials into the portal. This avoids the multi-week Meta verification process while shipping.
Primary recommendation: Build Slack OAuth → Stripe billing → BYO key encryption → cost dashboard in that order. Each is independently deployable. Start with the audit trail metadata migration as Wave 0.
Standard Stack
Core
| Library | Version | Purpose | Why Standard |
|---|---|---|---|
stripe (Python) |
>=12.0.0 |
Stripe API, webhook verification, subscription management | Official Stripe Python SDK; StripeClient pattern is current API |
cryptography (Python) |
>=47.0.0 |
BYO key encryption via Fernet | pyca/cryptography is the Python standard; already used for bcrypt via bcrypt dep; Fernet is audited |
slack-bolt (Python) |
>=1.22.0 |
Slack OAuth installer, Events API | Already in CLAUDE.md tech stack; OAuthFlow handles token exchange |
stripe (npm) |
>=17.0.0 |
Stripe.js for frontend Checkout redirect | Official JS client |
recharts |
>=2.15.0 |
Cost dashboard charts | 17M weekly downloads vs Nivo's 2M; simpler JSX API; strong shadcn/ui alignment |
Supporting
| Library | Version | Purpose | When to Use |
|---|---|---|---|
@stripe/stripe-js |
>=5.0.0 |
Stripe Checkout redirect from browser | When creating Checkout Sessions from portal |
slack-sdk (Python) |
>=3.35.0 |
Lower-level Slack Web API calls (post test message) | For the "send test message" verification step |
Alternatives Considered
| Instead of | Could Use | Tradeoff |
|---|---|---|
| Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC) | AES-256-GCM via cryptography.hazmat |
AES-256-GCM is stronger but requires manual MAC management; Fernet is audited, has MultiFernet key rotation, and AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256 is sufficient for API key protection |
| Recharts | Nivo | Nivo has more chart types but 8x fewer downloads, worse documentation, and verbose API; Recharts is recommended for SaaS admin dashboards |
| Stripe Billing Portal (hosted) | Custom billing UI | Custom UI requires full payment method management; Billing Portal handles card updates, invoice history, cancellation in a Stripe-hosted page — use it |
Installation:
# Python (add to packages/shared/pyproject.toml)
uv add stripe cryptography
# Node (in packages/portal)
npm install recharts @stripe/stripe-js stripe
Architecture Patterns
Recommended Project Structure (new files only)
packages/
├── shared/
│ └── shared/
│ ├── models/
│ │ └── billing.py # TenantBilling, TenantLlmKey models
│ └── api/
│ ├── billing.py # Stripe webhooks + subscription endpoints
│ └── channels.py # Slack OAuth callback, channel connection
├── portal/
│ └── app/
│ ├── api/
│ │ └── slack/
│ │ └── callback/
│ │ └── route.ts # Slack OAuth redirect handler
│ └── (dashboard)/
│ ├── onboarding/
│ │ └── page.tsx # Connect Channel → Configure Agent → Test
│ ├── billing/
│ │ └── page.tsx # Subscription status + Billing Portal redirect
│ ├── usage/
│ │ └── [tenantId]/
│ │ └── page.tsx # Cost dashboard per tenant
│ └── settings/
│ └── api-keys/
│ └── page.tsx # BYO key management
migrations/
└── versions/
├── xxxx_add_billing_fields.py # stripe_customer_id, subscription_status, trial_ends_at on tenants
├── xxxx_add_tenant_llm_keys.py # tenant_llm_keys table
└── xxxx_add_token_fields.py # prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, cost_usd, provider on audit_events
Pattern 1: Slack OAuth V2 Flow
What: Operator clicks "Add to Slack" → Slack authorization page → redirect back to portal callback → exchange code for bot token → store in channel_connections
Scopes required (bot):
app_mentions:read— receive @mention eventschannels:read— list public channelschannels:history— read channel message historychat:write— post messages (required for test message + agent replies)groups:read— private channelsim:read/im:write/im:history— DM supportmpim:read/mpim:history— multi-party DMs
OAuth V2 flow:
1. Operator visits /onboarding → clicks "Add to Slack"
2. Portal redirects to:
https://slack.com/oauth/v2/authorize
?client_id=<SLACK_CLIENT_ID>
&scope=app_mentions:read,channels:read,channels:history,chat:write,im:read,im:write,im:history
&redirect_uri=https://app.konstruct.ai/api/slack/callback
&state=<csrf_token:tenant_id>
3. User approves → Slack redirects to /api/slack/callback?code=xxx&state=yyy
4. FastAPI backend exchanges code:
POST https://slack.com/api/oauth.v2.access
client_id, client_secret, code, redirect_uri
5. Response contains:
{
"ok": true,
"access_token": "xoxb-...", ← bot token, store encrypted
"team": { "id": "T12345", "name": "Acme Corp" },
"bot_user_id": "U67890",
"scope": "app_mentions:read,..."
}
6. Store in channel_connections:
- channel_type: "slack"
- workspace_id: team.id
- config: { "bot_token": encrypt(access_token), "bot_user_id": ..., "team_name": ... }
State parameter must encode tenant_id + CSRF token (sign with HMAC-SHA256, verify on callback).
# Source: https://docs.slack.dev/authentication/installing-with-oauth/
# Generate state
import hmac, hashlib, secrets, json, base64
def generate_oauth_state(tenant_id: str, secret: str) -> str:
nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
payload = json.dumps({"tenant_id": tenant_id, "nonce": nonce})
sig = hmac.new(secret.encode(), payload.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(f"{payload}:{sig}".encode()).decode()
def verify_oauth_state(state: str, secret: str) -> str:
"""Returns tenant_id or raises ValueError."""
decoded = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(state.encode()).decode()
payload_str, sig = decoded.rsplit(":", 1)
expected = hmac.new(secret.encode(), payload_str.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected):
raise ValueError("Invalid OAuth state")
return json.loads(payload_str)["tenant_id"]
Pattern 2: Stripe Per-Agent Subscription
What: Operator subscribes → Checkout Session created with quantity=agent_count → redirected to Stripe → on success webhook, provision access.
Key objects to persist on Tenant:
stripe_customer_id(String) — created once per tenant on first subscriptionstripe_subscription_id(String | None)stripe_subscription_item_id(String | None) — needed for quantity updatessubscription_status(Enum:trialing,active,past_due,canceled,unpaid)trial_ends_at(DateTime | None)agent_quota(Integer) — number of paid seats
Checkout Session creation (Python):
# Source: https://docs.stripe.com/payments/checkout/build-subscriptions
import stripe
client = stripe.StripeClient(api_key=settings.stripe_secret_key)
session = client.v1.checkout.sessions.create({
"mode": "subscription",
"customer": tenant.stripe_customer_id, # or create new
"line_items": [{
"price": settings.stripe_per_agent_price_id,
"quantity": agent_count, # number of agents being subscribed
}],
"subscription_data": {
"trial_period_days": 14,
},
"success_url": f"{settings.portal_url}/billing?session_id={{CHECKOUT_SESSION_ID}}",
"cancel_url": f"{settings.portal_url}/billing",
})
# Return session.url to frontend for redirect
Quantity update when agents are added/removed:
# Source: https://docs.stripe.com/api/subscription_items/update?lang=python
client.v1.subscription_items.update(
tenant.stripe_subscription_item_id,
{"quantity": new_agent_count},
)
Billing Portal session:
# Source: https://docs.stripe.com/customer-management/integrate-customer-portal
portal_session = client.v1.billing_portal.sessions.create({
"customer": tenant.stripe_customer_id,
"return_url": f"{settings.portal_url}/billing",
})
# Return portal_session.url to frontend
Pattern 3: Stripe Webhook Handler
Critical webhook events to handle:
| Event | Action |
|---|---|
checkout.session.completed |
Store subscription_id, subscription_item_id, set status trialing or active |
customer.subscription.created |
Same as above if not using Checkout |
customer.subscription.updated |
Update subscription_status, agent_quota, trial_ends_at |
customer.subscription.deleted |
Set status canceled, deactivate all agents |
customer.subscription.trial_will_end |
Send alert email (3 days before trial ends) |
invoice.paid |
Set status active, re-enable agents if they were suspended |
invoice.payment_failed |
Set status past_due, send payment failure notification |
FastAPI webhook endpoint:
# Source: https://docs.stripe.com/webhooks
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, HTTPException
import stripe
webhook_router = APIRouter()
@webhook_router.post("/webhooks/stripe")
async def stripe_webhook(
request: Request,
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
) -> dict[str, str]:
payload = await request.body()
sig_header = request.headers.get("stripe-signature", "")
try:
event = stripe.WebhookEvent.construct_from(
stripe.Webhook.construct_event(
payload, sig_header, settings.stripe_webhook_secret
).to_dict(),
stripe.api_key,
)
except stripe.SignatureVerificationError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid signature")
# Idempotency: check if event already processed
already_processed = await _check_event_processed(session, event["id"])
if already_processed:
return {"status": "already_processed"}
await _record_event_processed(session, event["id"])
await _dispatch_event(session, event)
return {"status": "ok"}
Idempotency table: Add a stripe_events table with (event_id PRIMARY KEY, processed_at) — INSERT with ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING; if 0 rows affected, skip processing.
Non-payment enforcement: When subscription_status becomes past_due after grace period (configurable, suggest 7 days), set Agent.is_active = False for all tenant agents. The gateway/orchestrator already gates on is_active, so no further changes needed.
Pattern 4: BYO API Key Encryption (Envelope Encryption)
What: Tenant provides their OpenAI/Anthropic API key. We encrypt it before storing. The platform-level master encryption key is in environment variables (or secrets manager).
Important: Fernet uses AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256, NOT AES-256. This is still cryptographically sound and the cryptography library is audited. CLAUDE.md specifies "AES-256" aspirationally — Fernet is the correct practical choice. Document this tradeoff in ADR-005.
Schema — new table tenant_llm_keys:
CREATE TABLE tenant_llm_keys (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
provider TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'openai' | 'anthropic' | 'custom'
label TEXT NOT NULL, -- human-readable name
encrypted_key TEXT NOT NULL,
key_version INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- for rotation tracking
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
UNIQUE(tenant_id, provider) -- one key per provider per tenant
);
-- RLS enabled: same pattern as agents table
Encryption service:
# Source: https://cryptography.io/en/latest/fernet/
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, MultiFernet
import os
class KeyEncryptionService:
"""
Encrypts/decrypts tenant BYO API keys.
PLATFORM_ENCRYPTION_KEY env var must be a URL-safe base64 Fernet key.
For rotation: PLATFORM_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS holds the prior key.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
primary = Fernet(os.environ["PLATFORM_ENCRYPTION_KEY"])
keys = [primary]
if prev := os.environ.get("PLATFORM_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS"):
keys.append(Fernet(prev))
self._fernet = MultiFernet(keys)
def encrypt(self, plaintext: str) -> str:
return self._fernet.encrypt(plaintext.encode()).decode()
def decrypt(self, ciphertext: str) -> str:
return self._fernet.decrypt(ciphertext.encode()).decode()
def rotate(self, ciphertext: str) -> str:
"""Re-encrypt under the current primary key."""
return self._fernet.rotate(ciphertext.encode()).decode()
Key generation for setup:
python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
LiteLLM integration: When routing LLM calls, check if the tenant has a BYO key for the requested provider. If yes, decrypt and inject into the LiteLLM call. Never log the decrypted key.
Pattern 5: Cost Dashboard — Audit Event Aggregation
CRITICAL PREREQUISITE: The current audit logger stores model in metadata but NOT token counts. The runner.py log_llm_call metadata must be extended before the cost dashboard can work.
Required metadata fields to add to log_llm_call:
# In orchestrator/agents/runner.py — extend existing metadata dict:
metadata={
"model": data.get("model", agent.model_preference),
"provider": _extract_provider(data.get("model", "")), # "openai" | "anthropic" | "ollama"
"prompt_tokens": usage.get("prompt_tokens", 0),
"completion_tokens": usage.get("completion_tokens", 0),
"total_tokens": usage.get("total_tokens", 0),
"cost_usd": _calculate_cost(model, usage), # pre-calculated, stored as float
"iteration": iteration,
"tool_calls_count": len(response_tool_calls),
}
Dashboard aggregation query:
-- Token usage per agent for a time range
SELECT
agent_id,
SUM((metadata->>'prompt_tokens')::int) AS prompt_tokens,
SUM((metadata->>'completion_tokens')::int) AS completion_tokens,
SUM((metadata->>'total_tokens')::int) AS total_tokens,
SUM((metadata->>'cost_usd')::float) AS cost_usd,
COUNT(*) AS llm_call_count
FROM audit_events
WHERE
tenant_id = :tenant_id
AND action_type = 'llm_call'
AND created_at >= :start_date
AND created_at < :end_date
GROUP BY agent_id;
-- Cost by provider
SELECT
metadata->>'provider' AS provider,
SUM((metadata->>'cost_usd')::float) AS cost_usd,
COUNT(*) AS call_count
FROM audit_events
WHERE
tenant_id = :tenant_id
AND action_type = 'llm_call'
AND created_at >= :start_date
GROUP BY metadata->>'provider';
-- Message volume by channel (count message events)
SELECT
metadata->>'channel' AS channel,
COUNT(*) AS message_count
FROM audit_events
WHERE
tenant_id = :tenant_id
AND action_type = 'llm_call'
AND created_at >= :start_date
GROUP BY metadata->>'channel';
Index required:
CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY idx_audit_events_tenant_type_created
ON audit_events (tenant_id, action_type, created_at DESC);
-- GIN index for JSONB queries if aggregation volume is high
CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY idx_audit_events_metadata
ON audit_events USING GIN (metadata);
Time range options (Claude's discretion): Offer Last 7 days / Last 30 days / This month / Custom range. Default to Last 30 days. Use a simple <select> driving a query param — no date picker library needed for v1.
Budget alert logic: Compare SUM(cost_usd) against Agent.budget_limit_usd (new field). Visual indicator: amber at 80%, red at 100%. Render as colored badge on the cost dashboard row, not a modal.
Pattern 6: WhatsApp Manual Setup (Claude's Discretion Recommendation)
Embedded Signup requires a registered BSP/Meta Tech Provider account — multi-week verification process. For v1, use guided manual setup:
- Operator creates a Meta/Facebook developer account and a WhatsApp Business App
- Portal shows step-by-step instructions with screenshots
- Operator pastes: Phone Number ID, WhatsApp Business Account ID, permanent System User Token
- Portal validates by calling
GET https://graph.facebook.com/v22.0/{phone_number_id}with the token - If valid, store in
channel_connections.config(token encrypted with Fernet) - Test message: send "Konstruct connected successfully" to operator's own WhatsApp number
Anti-Patterns to Avoid
- Do not verify Stripe webhooks manually — always use
stripe.Webhook.construct_event()with the endpoint secret; raw header parsing is error-prone - Do not store Slack bot tokens in plaintext — encrypt with Fernet before writing to
channel_connections.config - Do not update subscription quantity synchronously — Stripe rate-limits if updated many times per hour; queue via Celery if high-frequency
- Do not re-query audit_events without the partial index — full table scan on audit_events will be slow; the composite index on
(tenant_id, action_type, created_at)is mandatory - Do not use
func.now()fortrial_ends_atcalculation — set it from the Stripe webhook responsesubscription.trial_end(Unix timestamp), not from local time
Don't Hand-Roll
| Problem | Don't Build | Use Instead | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| OAuth state CSRF protection | Custom state encoding | HMAC-signed state (shown above) | Replay attacks, timing attacks |
| Stripe signature verification | Manual HMAC check on raw bytes | stripe.Webhook.construct_event() |
Handles timestamp tolerance, replay prevention |
| Subscription lifecycle state machine | Custom FSM | Stripe subscription status field + webhooks |
Stripe handles payment retries, dunning, proration |
| API key encryption | Custom AES wrapper | cryptography.fernet.Fernet + MultiFernet |
Audited, handles IV generation, MAC, key rotation |
| Billing UI (card updates, invoices) | Custom payment form | Stripe Billing Portal | PCI scope, card updating, invoice history — all free |
| Token cost calculation | Per-request cost estimation | Pre-calculate at log time using LiteLLM's completion_cost() |
LiteLLM already tracks pricing per model; reuse it |
Key insight: Stripe and Slack provide hosted/SDK flows for the most security-sensitive parts. Never replicate what they already do correctly.
Common Pitfalls
Pitfall 1: Slack OAuth state Not Validated
What goes wrong: Attacker crafts a Slack OAuth callback with a valid code but forged state, linking their Slack workspace to a victim's tenant.
Why it happens: Treating OAuth state as opaque and skipping verification.
How to avoid: Always HMAC-sign the state before sending; verify the signature AND the tenant_id before exchanging the code.
Warning signs: No state validation in the callback handler.
Pitfall 2: Stripe Webhook Raw Body Mangling
What goes wrong: Signature verification fails in production because a middleware (e.g., JSON parser) modifies the request body before the webhook handler reads it.
Why it happens: FastAPI's Request.json() parses the body; Stripe signatures are computed over the raw bytes.
How to avoid: Always read with await request.body() (raw bytes), not await request.json().
Warning signs: stripe.SignatureVerificationError in production but not in local testing.
Pitfall 3: Duplicate Webhook Processing
What goes wrong: Stripe delivers the same event twice (network retry); agent gets provisioned twice, subscription updated twice.
Why it happens: No idempotency guard on the webhook handler.
How to avoid: Store processed event.id in a stripe_events table; use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING and check rows affected.
Warning signs: Duplicate channel_connections rows or double-charged agents.
Pitfall 4: Fernet Key Not in Environment
What goes wrong: Application starts without PLATFORM_ENCRYPTION_KEY set; first BYO key encryption call throws KeyError.
Why it happens: Key not added to .env.example / Docker Compose environment.
How to avoid: Validate key presence at startup in shared/config.py using pydantic-settings required fields; fail fast with a clear error.
Warning signs: KeyError: PLATFORM_ENCRYPTION_KEY in logs.
Pitfall 5: Audit Events Missing Token Metadata
What goes wrong: Cost dashboard shows zeros because prompt_tokens / cost_usd were never written to audit_events.metadata.
Why it happens: Runner logs the LLM call but doesn't extract token counts from the LiteLLM response object.
How to avoid: Extend runner.py metadata dict BEFORE Phase 3 dashboard work begins; backfill is impossible (audit log is append-only).
Warning signs: metadata->>'prompt_tokens' returns NULL in dashboard queries.
Pitfall 6: Subscription Quantity Mismatch
What goes wrong: Operator creates 3 agents in the portal but Stripe still charges for 1.
Why it happens: Agent creation doesn't trigger a subscription quantity update.
How to avoid: On POST /agents and DELETE /agents, update Stripe subscription item quantity. Use a Celery task to avoid blocking the API response.
Warning signs: stripe_subscription_item_id is NULL; no Celery task defined for quantity sync.
Code Examples
Verified patterns from official sources:
Stripe Subscription Creation with Trial
# Source: https://docs.stripe.com/api/subscriptions/create?lang=python
client = stripe.StripeClient(api_key=settings.stripe_secret_key)
subscription = client.v1.subscriptions.create({
"customer": customer_id,
"trial_period_days": 14,
"items": [{"price": settings.stripe_per_agent_price_id, "quantity": agent_count}],
})
# subscription.id → store as stripe_subscription_id
# subscription.items.data[0].id → store as stripe_subscription_item_id
Stripe Subscription Quantity Update
# Source: https://docs.stripe.com/api/subscription_items/update?lang=python
client.v1.subscription_items.update(
tenant.stripe_subscription_item_id,
{"quantity": new_agent_count},
)
Fernet Encrypt/Decrypt API Key
# Source: https://cryptography.io/en/latest/fernet/
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
key = Fernet.generate_key() # run once, store in env
f = Fernet(key)
ciphertext = f.encrypt(b"sk-openai-key...").decode()
plaintext = f.decrypt(ciphertext.encode()).decode()
MultiFernet Key Rotation
# Source: https://cryptography.io/en/latest/fernet/
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, MultiFernet
# Step 1: Add new key to front, keep old key
new_fernet = MultiFernet([Fernet(new_key), Fernet(old_key)])
# Step 2: Rotate all existing ciphertexts in DB
async for row in session.stream(select(TenantLlmKey)):
row.encrypted_key = new_fernet.rotate(row.encrypted_key.encode()).decode()
row.key_version += 1
await session.commit()
# Step 3: Remove old key from env, restart
Recharts Bar Chart for Token Usage
// Source: recharts.org/api-reference
// Install: npm install recharts
import { BarChart, Bar, XAxis, YAxis, CartesianGrid, Tooltip, ResponsiveContainer } from "recharts";
<ResponsiveContainer width="100%" height={300}>
<BarChart data={agentUsageData}>
<CartesianGrid strokeDasharray="3 3" />
<XAxis dataKey="agentName" />
<YAxis />
<Tooltip formatter={(value) => [`${value} tokens`, "Usage"]} />
<Bar dataKey="total_tokens" fill="#6366f1" radius={[4, 4, 0, 0]} />
</BarChart>
</ResponsiveContainer>
SQLAlchemy Async Aggregate Query for Cost
# Source: SQLAlchemy 2.0 docs + project pattern
from sqlalchemy import select, func, text
from shared.models.audit import AuditEvent
result = await session.execute(
select(
AuditEvent.agent_id,
func.sum(
func.cast(AuditEvent.metadata["total_tokens"].astext, Integer)
).label("total_tokens"),
func.sum(
func.cast(AuditEvent.metadata["cost_usd"].astext, Float)
).label("cost_usd"),
func.count().label("call_count"),
)
.where(
AuditEvent.tenant_id == tenant_id,
AuditEvent.action_type == "llm_call",
AuditEvent.created_at >= start_date,
)
.group_by(AuditEvent.agent_id)
)
State of the Art
| Old Approach | Current Approach | When Changed | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
middleware.ts for auth guards |
proxy.ts (named export proxy) |
Next.js 16 | Already implemented in project; do not create middleware.ts |
stripe.Webhook.constructEvent() (old SDK) |
client.parse_event_notification() or stripe.Webhook.construct_event() |
stripe-python v12+ | Both work; use construct_event for consistency with FastAPI raw body pattern |
| On-Premises WhatsApp API | Cloud API only | Oct 2025 (deprecated) | Must use Cloud API; On-Premises is unsupported |
| Fernet single key | MultiFernet for key rotation | Always available | Use MultiFernet from day one; single key is not rotatable without downtime |
Deprecated/outdated:
middleware.tsin Next.js 16: renamed toproxy.tswith named exportproxy— already handled- WhatsApp On-Premises API: deprecated Oct 2025, Cloud API only
stripe.Customer.create()old-style: useStripeClient.v1.customers.create()with new client pattern
Open Questions
-
LiteLLM
completion_cost()availability- What we know: LiteLLM has a
completion_cost()utility that calculates cost from model name + token counts - What's unclear: Whether
llm-poolservice currently surfaces this in its response to the orchestrator, or whether the orchestrator calls LiteLLM directly - Recommendation: Inspect
packages/llm-poolto confirm response schema includesusageobject with token counts; if not, add it as Wave 0
- What we know: LiteLLM has a
-
Stripe Customer creation timing
- What we know:
stripe_customer_idneeds to exist before Checkout Session creation - What's unclear: Whether to create the Stripe Customer at tenant creation (Phase 1 migration needed) or lazily on first billing action
- Recommendation: Create lazily on first billing action — avoids creating Stripe customers for test/internal tenants
- What we know:
-
Slack OAuth callback — Next.js Route Handler vs FastAPI
- What we know: The OAuth redirect_uri must be a URL Konstruct controls; both portal (Next.js) and backend (FastAPI) can handle it
- What's unclear: Which service is public-facing for the OAuth callback
- Recommendation: Handle in Next.js Route Handler (
app/api/slack/callback/route.ts) which calls the FastAPI backend to store the token; cleaner separation and avoids CORS complications
-
Budget limit storage location
- What we know: AGNT-07 requires per-agent budget limits; CONTEXT.md shows budget as visual alert
- What's unclear: Whether budget limit is per-agent on the
agentstable or per-tenant on thetenantstable - Recommendation: Add
budget_limit_usdto theAgentmodel (per-agent is more flexible); default NULL means no limit
Validation Architecture
Test Framework
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Framework | pytest 8.3.0 + pytest-asyncio 0.25.0 |
| Config file | pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options] |
| Quick run command | pytest tests/unit -x |
| Full suite command | pytest tests/unit tests/integration -x |
Phase Requirements → Test Map
| Req ID | Behavior | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AGNT-07 | Token usage aggregation query returns correct totals | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_usage_aggregation.py -x |
Wave 0 |
| AGNT-07 | Budget alert threshold triggers at 80% and 100% | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_budget_alerts.py -x |
Wave 0 |
| LLM-03 | Fernet encrypt/decrypt round-trip preserves plaintext | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_key_encryption.py -x |
Wave 0 |
| LLM-03 | MultiFernet key rotation re-encrypts without data loss | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_key_encryption.py::test_rotation -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-03 | Slack OAuth state HMAC generation + verification | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_slack_oauth.py -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-03 | Slack OAuth callback stores channel_connection correctly | integration | pytest tests/integration/test_slack_oauth.py -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-04 | Onboarding stepper transitions through all 3 steps | manual | — | manual-only (UI flow) |
| PRTA-04 | Test message send endpoint returns 200 with valid token | integration | pytest tests/integration/test_channel_test_message.py -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-05 | Stripe webhook handler ignores duplicate event IDs | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_stripe_webhooks.py::test_idempotency -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-05 | Subscription status updates on customer.subscription.updated |
unit | pytest tests/unit/test_stripe_webhooks.py::test_subscription_updated -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-05 | Agent deactivation on subscription cancellation | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_stripe_webhooks.py::test_cancellation -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-06 | Cost aggregation query groups tokens by agent_id | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_usage_aggregation.py::test_group_by_agent -x |
Wave 0 |
| PRTA-06 | Cost aggregation query groups cost by provider | unit | pytest tests/unit/test_usage_aggregation.py::test_group_by_provider -x |
Wave 0 |
Sampling Rate
- Per task commit:
pytest tests/unit -x - Per wave merge:
pytest tests/unit tests/integration -x - Phase gate: Full suite green before
/gsd:verify-work
Wave 0 Gaps
tests/unit/test_key_encryption.py— covers LLM-03 (Fernet encrypt/decrypt/rotate)tests/unit/test_slack_oauth.py— covers PRTA-03 (state HMAC generation/verification)tests/unit/test_stripe_webhooks.py— covers PRTA-05 (idempotency, status updates, cancellation)tests/unit/test_usage_aggregation.py— covers AGNT-07, PRTA-06 (SQL aggregate queries)tests/unit/test_budget_alerts.py— covers AGNT-07 (threshold logic)tests/integration/test_slack_oauth.py— covers PRTA-03 (full callback flow)tests/integration/test_channel_test_message.py— covers PRTA-04 (test message endpoint)packages/shared/shared/models/billing.py— TenantBilling fields migration modelpackages/shared/shared/models/billing.py— TenantLlmKey model- Alembic migration:
audit_eventsmetadata fields (prompt_tokens,completion_tokens,cost_usd,provider) - Alembic migration:
tenant_llm_keystable - Alembic migration:
tenantsbilling fields (stripe_customer_id,stripe_subscription_id,stripe_subscription_item_id,subscription_status,trial_ends_at,agent_quota) - Alembic migration:
agents.budget_limit_usdfield - Alembic migration:
stripe_eventsidempotency table - npm install:
recharts @stripe/stripe-js stripeinpackages/portal - uv add:
stripe cryptographyinpackages/shared
Sources
Primary (HIGH confidence)
- https://cryptography.io/en/latest/fernet/ — Fernet spec, AES-128-CBC+HMAC-SHA256, MultiFernet rotation
- https://docs.stripe.com/billing/subscriptions/webhooks — webhook event types, idempotency
- https://docs.stripe.com/api/subscriptions/create?lang=python — subscription creation with trial and quantity
- https://docs.stripe.com/api/subscription_items/update?lang=python — quantity update API
- https://docs.stripe.com/customer-management/integrate-customer-portal — Billing Portal session creation
- https://docs.slack.dev/authentication/installing-with-oauth/ — OAuth V2 flow
- https://docs.slack.dev/apis/events-api/ — scopes for Events API
- https://docs.slack.dev/authentication/tokens/ — bot token types
packages/portal/node_modules/next/dist/docs/01-app/01-getting-started/16-proxy.md— Next.js 16 proxy.ts (not middleware.ts)packages/portal/node_modules/next/dist/docs/01-app/01-getting-started/15-route-handlers.md— Route Handlers- Existing project source:
packages/orchestrator/orchestrator/audit/logger.py,packages/shared/shared/models/audit.py,packages/shared/shared/models/tenant.py
Secondary (MEDIUM confidence)
- https://docs.stripe.com/webhooks — webhook signature verification in Python
- https://docs.stripe.com/subscriptions/pricing-models/per-seat-pricing — per-seat quantity model
- https://www.speakeasy.com/blog/nivo-vs-recharts — Recharts vs Nivo comparison (Recharts recommended)
- https://npmtrends.com/chart.js-vs-highcharts-vs-nivo-vs-recharts — download statistics confirming Recharts dominance
Tertiary (LOW confidence)
- WhatsApp Embedded Signup standard status (2026) — multiple secondary sources agree; not directly verified against Meta developer docs within this research session
Metadata
Confidence breakdown:
- Standard stack: HIGH — all libraries verified against official docs or project package.json
- Slack OAuth flow: HIGH — verified against official Slack developer docs
- Stripe billing: HIGH — verified against official Stripe API reference and docs
- BYO key encryption: HIGH — verified against official cryptography.io docs; note Fernet is AES-128 not AES-256
- Cost aggregation: MEDIUM — SQL pattern is standard PostgreSQL JSONB; exact SQLAlchemy ORM casting syntax needs validation against project's asyncpg driver
- Recharts: MEDIUM — download stats verified via npmtrends; API verified against recharts.org
- WhatsApp manual setup: MEDIUM — On-Premises deprecation confirmed; manual setup steps derived from Meta developer docs indirectly
Research date: 2026-03-23 Valid until: 2026-04-23 (Stripe and Slack APIs are stable; Next.js 16 is current)